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Abstract
We prove the existence of comonotone Pareto optimal allocations satisfying utility con-
straints when decision makers have probabilistic sophisticated variational preferences and
thus representing criteria in the class of law invariant robust utilities. The total endowment
is only required to be integrable.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we prove the existence of Pareto optimal allocations of integrable random endow-
ments when decision makers have probabilistic sophisticated variational preferences. Variational
preferences were introduced and axiomatically characterized by Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rus-
tichini (2006). This broad class of preferences allows to model ambiguity aversion and includes
several subclasses of preferences that have been extensively studied in the economic literature. In
mathematical finance, variational preferences are known as robust utilities; see Fo¨llmer, Schied,
∗The author gratefully acknowledges financial support of the NCCR-FinRisk (Swiss National Science Founda-
tion).
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and Weber (2009) and the references therein. In particular, Fo¨llmer et al. (2009) establish the
connection between variational preferences and robust utilities as representing choice criteria
of variational preferences on random endowments corresponding to Savage acts; see also Re-
mark 2.2 for a brief summary of these results. Our study focuses on variational preferences
which are in addition assumed to be probabilistic sophisticated1 and thus can be represented
by robust utilities which are law invariant. Probabilistic sophistication or law invariance means
that the decision maker sees any two random endowments that have the same distribution un-
der a reference probability measure as equivalent. To be consistent both with the literature on
decision making and (mathematical) finance, we use the term probabilistic sophistication when-
ever referring to preferences, and law invariance whenever referring to the representing robust
utility. We pursue this approach – in the spirit of Fo¨llmer et al. (2009) – in an attempt to unify
the current knowledge on Pareto optimal allocations, and to emphasize the range of the results
presented in this paper.
The class of law invariant robust utilities which represent probabilistic sophisticated varia-
tional preferences are of the following type:
(1.1) U(X) = inf
Q∈Q
(EQ[u(X)] + α(Q)) , X ∈ L1,
where u : R→ R∪{−∞} is a (not necessarily strictly) concave (not necessarily strictly) increas-
ing utility function, Q is a set of probability measures which is closed under densities with the
same distribution, and α(Q) is a suited law invariant penalization on Q ∈ Q; see Definition 2.1
for the details. This broad class nests many well-known choice criteria studied in the economic
and finance literature, in particular, the von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) expected utility,
the probabilistic sophisticated maxmin expected utility preferences introduced by Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989), the multiplier preferences introduced by Hansen and Sargent (2000, 2001),
and (apart from the sign) the law invariant cash (sub)-additive convex risk measures introduced
by Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999), Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002), and Frittelli and
Rosazza Gianin (2005) with the property of cash-invariance, and by El Karoui and Ravanelli
(2010) with the generalized property of cash (sub)-additivity.
1Probabilistic sophisticated preferences were introduced by Machina and Schmeidler (1992), further studied
by Marinacci (2002) and by Maccheroni et al. (2006) and Strzalecki (2011) for the case of variational preferences.
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We assume that the decision makers have preferences on a space of future random payoff
profiles which we identify with L1 := L1(Ω,F ,P), i.e. the space of P-integrable random variables
on a fixed non-atomic probability space (Ω,F ,P) modulo P-almost sure equality, where P is the
reference probability measure. So far, most of the existing literature makes the assumption that
payoff profiles are bounded, i.e. in L∞, or even that the state space is finite. These assumptions
are justified in many settings. But for applications in finance where nearly all models involve
unbounded distributions, the boundedness assumption is not appropriate. This suggests the
model space L1 and the probabilistic sophistication of the preferences indeed allows for that;
see Remark 2.2 or Filipovic´ and Svindland (2012).
In this paper we consider n ≥ 2 decision makers with probabilistic sophisticated variational
preferences on L1 represented by law invariant robust utilities as in (1.1). All decision makers
share the same reference probability. Given the initial endowments Wi ∈ L1, i = 1, . . . , n,
of the decision makers, we prove the existence of comonotone Pareto optimal allocations of the
aggregate endowment W = W1+. . .+Wn which satisfy individual rationality constraints. Indeed
we show that under some mild conditions comonotone Pareto optima exist for basically any
constraints on the utilities of the allocations as long as there is at least one allocation satisfying
these constraints. Note that comonotonicity means that the endowments in the allocation are
continuous increasing functions of the aggregate endowment W . Comonotonicity of the Pareto
optima is a consequence of the law invariant robust utilities preserving second order stochastic
dominance; see Section 3.2. The possibility to restrain the set of allocations to the comonotone
ones in the optimization problem corresponding to Pareto optima is also a major ingredient in
our existence proof.
The existence of Pareto optimal allocations has so far only been established for a few sub-
classes of law invariant robust utilities. In case that all decision makers have von Neumann–
Morgenstern expected utilities, existence results were already proved in the sixties by Borch
(1962), Arrow (1963) and Wilson (1968). More recent is the proof of the existence of Pareto
optimal allocations when all decision makers apply law invariant convex risk measures on L∞;
see Jouini, Schachermayer, and Touzi (2008) (and also Acciaio (2007) and Barrieu and El Karoui
(2005)) and references therein. Filipovic´ and Svindland (2008) extend this result to integrable
(not necessarily bounded) aggregate endowments. Even more recently, Dana (2011) proves the
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existence of Pareto optimal allocations when the decision makers have choice criteria within a
class of law invariant, finitely valued, continuous, concave utility functions on L∞ not necessarily
representing variational preferences. In Dana (2011) at least one utility function is required to
be cash additive and the others are assumed to be strictly concave. Note that the cash addi-
tivity assumption is very useful when proving the existence of optimal allocations because, in
conjunction with a comonotone improvement result, it immediately allows us to restrain the op-
timal allocation problem to an essentially compact set. Dropping the cash additivity assumption
generates some difficulties which we are able to solve: Indeed, we also reduce the problem to an
optimization over an essentially compact set of comonotone allocations. However, in contrast
to the cash additive case, in which this reduction can be simply imposed due to the invariance
towards constant re-sharing of sure payoffs, in the concave (non cash additive) case it follows as
a necessity from the concavity of the utility functions u in (1.1). Other results on the existence
of Pareto optimal allocations are found in Kiesel and Ru¨schendorf (2008). Here the existence
of optimal allocations is proved for convex risk functionals on L∞ which are not necessarily law
invariant, however, under the assumption that the aggregate endowment W is in the interior
of the domain of the (infimal-)convolution of the convex risk functionals, and that there exists
an interior point in the intersection of the domains of the dual functions of these risk func-
tionals. Such interior point conditions are standard when arguing by means of convex duality
theory. Unfortunately, such results are not applicable in our case. The reason is that on large
model spaces like L1 the interior of the domains of the robust utilities (1.1), as well as of their
(sup-)convolutions, are in general empty. Reducing the model space to e.g. L∞ could solve that
problem, but then monotonicity implies that the interior of the domain of the dual function is
always empty because it is concentrated on the positive cone of the dual space. Another result
in the economic literature is provided by Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008). Here the au-
thors prove the existence of Pareto optimal allocations for variational preferences on the positive
cone of L∞ under the strong assumption of mutual absolute continuity, which is in general not
satisfied in our case.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce probabilistic sophisticated vari-
ational preferences and law invariant robust utilities on L1 and we recall some useful properties.
The Pareto optimal allocations problem is studied throughout Section 3 in which we state our
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main results. Section 4 briefly summarizes our main result on the existence of comonotone
Pareto optimal allocations whereas in Section 5 we provide examples illustrating our findings.
2 Setup
Throughout this paper (Ω,F ,P) is an atom-less probability space, i.e. a probability space sup-
porting a random variable with continuous distribution. All equalities and inequalities between
random variables are understood in the P-a.s. sense. Given two random variables X and Y we
write X
d
= Y to indicate that both random variables have the same distribution under the ref-
erence probability measure P. The expectation (if well-defined) of a random variable X under
a probability measure Q on (Ω,F) will be denoted by EQ[X]. In case Q = P we also write
E[X] := EP[X]. We denote by L1 := L1(Ω,F ,P) the space of P-integrable random variables
modulo P-almost sure equality.
2.1 Probabilistic Sophisticated Variational Preferences on L1
Variational preferences were introduced by Maccheroni et al. (2006). In the same paper the au-
thors also study the subclass of probabilistic sophisticated variational preferences. Probabilistic
sophistication means that X
d
= Y implies X ∼ Y in the preference order.
Definition 2.1. (i) A function u : R→ R∪{−∞} is a utility function (on R) if it is concave,
right-continuous, increasing, dom u := {x ∈ R | u(x) > −∞} 6= ∅, and not constant in the
sense that there exist x, y ∈ dom u such that u(x) 6= u(y).
(ii) Let ∆ denote the set of all probability measures Q on (Ω,F) which are absolutely continuous
and have bounded densities with respect to P, i.e. ∀A ∈ F , P(A) = 0 ⇒ Q(A) = 0, and
there exists K > 0 such that P
(
dQ
dP < K
)
= 1. A set of probability measures Q ⊂ ∆ is
closed under densities with the same distribution if Q ∈ Q and Q̂ ∈ ∆ with dQ̂dP
d
= dQdP
implies that Q̂ ∈ Q.
(iii) A decision maker has probabilistic sophisticated variational preferences  if for all X,Y ∈
L1:
X  Y ⇔ inf
Q∈Q
(EQ[u(X)] + α(Q)) ≥ inf
Q∈Q
(EQ[u(Y )] + α(Q))
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where u is a utility function, ∅ 6= Q ⊂ ∆ is convex and closed under densities with the same
distribution, and α : Q → R is a convex and law invariant function on Q in the sense that
Q, Q̂ ∈ Q with dQ̂dP
d
= dQdP implies α(Q̂) = α(Q). In addition α satisfies infQ∈Q α(Q) > −∞.
The numerical representation
(2.1) U : L1 → R ∪ {−∞}, X 7→ inf
Q∈Q
(EQ[u(X)] + α(Q)) ,
is the law invariant robust utility used by the decision maker to quantify the utility of a
payoff profile X ∈ L1.
The law invariant robust utility U in (2.1) is, clearly, law invariant2 (X d= Y implies U(X) =
U(Y )) and posseses some other useful properties which are collected in Lemma 2.3 below. Due to
Jensen’s inequality for concave functions, the expectations in (2.1) are all well-defined, possibly
taking the value −∞. Note that U(X) = −∞ is possible for some X ∈ L1. The interpretation
is that the payoff profiles with utility −∞ are totally unacceptable.
We remark that what we call a utility function in Definition 2.1 (i) satisfies relatively weak
requirements and nests the vast majority of utilities proposed in the economic, finance, and
insurance literature (like CARA and CRRA), also including extreme cases such as increasing
linear or affine functions (Convex Risk Measures). Notice that by allowing u to take the value
−∞ we incorporate the cases when the domain of the utility function u is bounded from below,
as e.g. for the power utilities or the logarithmic utilities.
Remark 2.2. A standard approach to modeling preferences in presence of model ambiguity
(Knightian uncertainty) is to consider preference orders on the set M of all Markov kernels
X (ω, dy) from (Ω,F) to (R,B(R)) (where B(R) denotes the Borel-σ-algebra) for which there
exists a k > 0 such that X (ω, [−k, k]) = 1 for all ω ∈ Ω. It can then be shown under some mild
additional assumptions that a preference order onM is in the class of variational preferences if
and only if it admits a numerical representation of the form
(2.2) U(X ) = inf
Q∈C
(∫ ∫
u(y)X (ω, dy) dQ(ω) + α(Q)
)
, X ∈M.
2Since U is defined via the law invariant penalization α, it is law invariant. This follows as in Fo¨llmer and
Schied (2004) Theorem 4.54. Conversely, the dual function in the convex duality sense of a law invariant concave
function U : L1 → R ∪ {−∞}, which in particular can serve as a penalization α in the sense of (2.1), is always
law invariant; again see Fo¨llmer and Schied (2004) Theorem 4.54.
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Here u is a utility function on R, and without loss of generality we may assume that C is the set of
all finitely additive normalized measures, and α : C → R∪{∞} is a convex law invariant function
with the additional property of being the minimal function for which U can be represented as in
(2.2). For an axiomatic definition of variational preferences on Markov kernels and the details
on their numerical representation (2.2) we refer to Fo¨llmer et al. (2009). Notice that the space
of all bounded payoff profiles L∞ is naturally embedded into the space M by identifying each
X ∈ L∞ with the associated kernel X (ω, dy) = δX(ω)(dy) where δx denotes the Dirac measure
given x ∈ R. The restriction of U to L∞ then takes the form
(2.3) U(X) = inf
Q∈C
(∫
u(X) dQ+ α(Q)
)
, X ∈ L∞,
which is a robust utility. In case of probabilistic sophistication/law invarinace, using results in
Svindland (2010a), it follows that U is σ(L∞, L∞)-upper semi continuous and thus we obtain a
representation of U as an infimum over σ-additive probability measures in ∆:
(2.4) U(X) = inf
Q∈Q
(EQ[u(X)] + α(Q)) , X ∈ L∞,
where Q := dom α∩∆. Hence, these preferences on L∞ are indeed consistent with our definition
of probabilistic sophisticated variational preferences on L1; see Definition 2.1. Moreover, the
representation (2.4) shows that the robust utility U and thus the corresponding preference order
is canonically extended from L∞ to L1. ♦
2.2 Properties of the Law Invariant Robust Utilities
In the following Lemma 2.3 we collect some well-known properties of law invariant robust utilities
on L1 which we will make frequently use of. The proofs can be found or easily derived from
results in for instance Dana (2005), Fo¨llmer and Schied (2004) and Maccheroni et al. (2006).
For the sake of completeness we provide a proof in Section A.
Lemma 2.3. Consider a law invariant robust utility U as in (2.1). Then U has the following
properties:
(i) properness: U <∞ and the domain dom U := {X ∈ L1 | U(X) > −∞} is not empty.
(ii) concavity: U(λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≥ λU(X) + (1− λ)U(Y ) for all λ ∈ [0, 1].
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(iii) monotonicity: X ≥ Y implies U(X) ≥ U(Y ).
(iv) ssd-monotonicity: X ssd Y implies U(X) ≥ U(Y ), where
X ssd Y ⇔ E[u(X)] ≥ E[u(Y )], for all utility functions u : R→ R,
is the second order stochastic dominance order.
(v) upper semi-continuity: If (Xn) ⊂ L1 converges to X ∈ L1 (with respect to ‖ · ‖1 := E[| · |]),
then U(X) ≥ lim supn→∞ U(Xn).
Probabilistic sophisticated variational preferences do not only preserve second order stochas-
tic dominance (Lemma 2.3 (iv)) but consequently also the concave order, i.e. X co Y implies
U(X) ≥ U(Y ), where co denotes the concave order, that is
X co Y ⇔ E[u(X)] ≥ E[u(Y )] for all concave functions u : R→ R.(2.5)
Clearly, X co Y implies X ssd Y . The property of preserving co is often referred to as
Schur concavity of U . Indeed, in case of monotone concave upper semi-continuous functions
ssd-monotonicity is equivalent to Schur concavity.
3 Comonotone Pareto Optimal Allocations for Probabilistic So-
phisticated Variational Preferences
Consider n ≥ 2 decision makers with initial endowments Wi ∈ L1. All decision makers are
assumed to have probabilistic sophisticated variational preferences on L1 and corresponding law
invariant robust utilities
(3.1) Ui(X) = inf
Q∈Qi
(EQ[ui(X)] + αi(Q)) , X ∈ L1, i = 1, . . . , n,
as defined in (2.1). We assume that Ui(Wi) > −∞ for all i = 1, . . . , n, and let W := W1+. . .+Wn
be the aggregate endowment.
Denote by A(W ) the set of all allocations of W , i.e.
A(W ) = {(X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ (L1)n |
n∑
i=1
Xi = W}.
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Recall that an allocation (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ A(W ) is Pareto optimal if (Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ A(W ) and
Ui(Yi) ≥ Ui(Xi) for i = 1, . . . , n implies that Ui(Yi) = Ui(Xi) for all i = 1, . . . , n. We are
interested in those Pareto optimal allocations which are in addition acceptable in the following
sense: Define the set Ac(W ) of all acceptable allocations of W as those (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ A(W )
such that Ui(Xi) > −∞ and
Ui(Xi) ≥ Ui(Wi)− ci(3.2)
for all i = 1, . . . , n, where ci ∈ R∪{∞}. The condition (3.2) expresses the individual (rationality)
constraint of decision maker i, specifying which payoff profiles Xi in a new re-allocation of W
she is willing to accept. Clearly, ci = 0 represents the (classical) case when the decision maker
will not accept any allocation which allots her an endowment which is not at least as good as
her initial one. An extreme is ci =∞ which means that the decision maker is willing to accept
any allocation with finite utility.3 We also allow for situations in which the decision maker is
to some bounded extent willing to accept a worsening as compared to her initial endowment
(ci > 0), or requires an improvement (ci < 0). Note that if ci ≥ 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then
the initial allocation (W1, . . . ,Wn) is acceptable, so in particular Ac(W ) 6= ∅. However, if some
agents demand a strict improvement, it is in general not clear whether the set of acceptable
allocations is non-empty. Hence, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 3.1. Ac(W ) 6= ∅.
3.1 Characterization of Pareto Optimal Allocations
It is well-known that Pareto optima can be characterized as solutions to a weighted sup-
convolution optimization problem
(3.3) Maximize
n∑
i=1
λiUi(Xi) subject to (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ A(W ),
where λi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n, are Negishi weights associated to the Pareto optimal allocation.
Notice that we do not require acceptability in (3.3). However, replacing A(W ) by Ac(W ) in
(3.3) characterizes acceptable Pareto optima as solutions to
(3.4) Maximize
n∑
i=1
λiUi(Xi) subject to (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ Ac(W )
3ci =∞ is understood as the restriction Ui(Xi) ≥ Ui(Wi)−∞ := −∞ being redundant.
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where again λi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n. The relation of (3.3) and (3.4) to (acceptable) Pareto optima
is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. If (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ A(W ) (∈ Ac(W )) is Pareto optimal (and acceptable), then
there exist weights λi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n, not all equal to zero, such that the allocation (X1, . . . , Xn)
solves (3.3) (or (3.4)) with these weights. Conversely, if (X1, . . . , Xn) solves (3.3) (or (3.4))
for some strictly positive weights λi > 0, i = 1, . . . , n, then (X1, . . . , Xn) is Pareto optimal (and
acceptable).
Let us briefly comment on the differences between the problems (3.3) and (3.4). It is easily
verified that any solution (X1, . . . , Xn) to either (3.3) or (3.4) for some strictly positive weights
λi > 0 is Pareto optimal. In case of (3.4) this follows from the fact that any other allocation
(Y1, . . . , Yn) with Ui(Yi) ≥ Ui(Xi) for all i would have to satisfy (Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ Ac(W ) too.
However, the solutions to (3.4) are acceptable Pareto optima. On the other hand, any acceptable
Pareto optimum (X1, . . . , Xn) can be characterized as a solution to both (3.3) and (3.4). Clearly,
for any Negishi weights (λ1, . . . , λn) associated to (X1, . . . , Xn) via (3.3), (X1, . . . , Xn) also solves
(3.4) with the same weights because Ac(W ) ⊂ A(W ). But in general the converse is not true.
The set of weights for which (X1, . . . , Xn) solves (3.4) does in general depend on the individual
constraints ci. This set increases as the set Ac(W ) decreases4, and is thus always a superset of
the set of Negishi weights associated to (X1, . . . , Xn) via (3.3). This latter set corresponds to
the limiting case where ci =∞ for all i and is valid for and therefore independent of any possible
individual constraints. Also notice that for given weights (λ1, . . . , λn) the solution to problem
(3.4) may depend on the individual constraints in the sense that changing the constraints gives
a different or no solution.5 When proving the existence of acceptable Pareto optima later on,
we will need both (3.3) and (3.4). More precisely, in Theorems 3.8 and 3.9 we will show that
there is an invariant (under all possible individual constraints) set of Negishi weights for which
(3.4) (and thus also the limiting case (3.3)) always admits a comonotone solution. This set of
Negishi weights however is given by the limiting case (3.3).
4See Example 5.4.
5The individual constraints may for instance imply that the closed set Ac(W ) is essentially bounded. Let us
think of it as compact. Then (3.4) will allow for a solution for any positive weights whereas the optimization (3.3)
over all allocations only works for certain weights.
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In the characterization of Pareto optima given in Proposition 3.2 the associated Negishi
weights in (3.3) or (3.4) can in general only be shown to be non-negative. So we may have
λj = 0 for some j.
6 As we will see in Section 3.3, our techniques allow us to prove the existence
of solutions to (3.4) only in case all Negishi weights are strictly positive, i.e. λi > 0 for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (see Theorems 3.8 and 3.9). So the question may arise what kind of Pareto
optimal allocations we are neglecting. The following Lemma 3.3 shows that very often there are
strictly positive Negishi weights for any Pareto optimum.
Lemma 3.3. Let (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ A(W ) be Pareto optimal and suppose that there is some  > 0
such that for any i = 1, . . . , n it holds that Ui(Xi − ) ∈ dom Ui and that
(0, ) 3 m 7→ Ui(Xi +m) is strictly increasing.
Then all Negishi weights associated to (X1, . . . , Xn) via (3.3) are strictly positive.
Proof. Let (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ A(W ) be Pareto optimal and consider any set of Negishi weights
(λ1, . . . , λn) associated to (X1, . . . , Xn) via (3.3). Assume that for some j ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have
λj = 0 and pick some k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that λk > 0 (Proposition 3.2). Consider the allocation
(X˜1, . . . , X˜n) ∈ A(W ) where X˜i = Xi for all i 6= j, k and X˜j = Xj− δ and X˜k = Xk + δ for some
δ ∈ (0, ). As λj = 0, we obtain
n∑
i=1
λiUi(X˜i) =
n∑
i=1;i 6=k,j
λiUi(Xi) + λkUk(Xk + δ)
>
n∑
i=1;i 6=k,j
λiUi(Xi) + λkUk(Xk) =
n∑
k=1
λiUi(Xi).(3.5)
which is a contradiction.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 3.3 and Proposition 3.2 is the following:
Corollary 3.4. Suppose that the Ui satisfy the following conditions for all i = 1, . . . , n:
• dom Ui = dom Ui + R,
• R 3 m 7→ Ui(X +m) is strictly increasing for all X ∈ dom Ui.
6Note that λj = 0 implies that the decision maker j is not considered in the social welfare maximization
problem (3.4).
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Then (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ A(W ) is Pareto optimal if and only if it solves (3.3) for some strictly
positive weights λi > 0, i = 1 . . . , n.
3.2 Comonotone Pareto Optimal Allocations
When proving the existence of solutions to (3.4), and thus of acceptable Pareto optimal al-
locations, we will profit from the fact that due to the ssd-monotonicity of the Ui we may
restrict our attention to the set of comonotone acceptable allocations defined next; see proofs of
Theorems 3.8 and 3.9 in Appendix C.
Definition 3.5. We denote by CF the set of all n-tuples (f1, . . . , fn) of increasing functions
fi : R→ R, i = 1, . . . , n, such that
∑n
i=1 fi = IdR. These functions fi are necessarily 1-Lipschitz-
continuous. An allocation (Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ A(W ), is comonotone if there exists (fi)ni=1 ∈ CF such
that Yi = fi(W ) for all i = 1, . . . , n.
In particular, it is known that if there exists a Pareto optimal allocation in our setting, then
there is also a comonotone one. This follows from the following Proposition.
Proposition 3.6. For any (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ Ac(W ) there exists a comonotone acceptable alloca-
tion (Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ Ac(W ) such that Yi co Xi (and thus Yi ssd Xi) for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. First of all we recall a result which is often referred to as comonotone improvement: for
any allocation (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ A(W ) there exists a comonotone allocation (Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ A(W )
such that Yi co Xi for all i = 1, . . . , n. The proof for the case when W is supported by
a finite set goes back to Landsberger and Meilijson (1994). This has been further extended
to aggregate endowments W ∈ L1 by Filipovic´ and Svindland (2008), Dana and Meilijson
(2011), and Ludkovski and Ru¨schendorf (2008). Finally, by ssd-monotonicity of the Ui (see
Lemma 2.3 (iv)) it follows that if (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ Ac(W ), then any comonotone improvement
(Y1, . . . , Yn) of (X1, . . . , Xn) is acceptable as well, i.e. (Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ Ac(W ).
Remark 3.7. The comonotone allocations have another desirable property. Suppose that
W ∈ Lp ⊂ L1 for some p ∈ [1,∞], and let (fi(W ))ni=1 be a comonotone allocation of W ,
i.e. (fi)
n
i=1 ∈ CF. Then, by the 1-Lipschitz continuity of the fi, it is easily verified that
(fi(W ))
n
i=1 ∈ (Lp)n. Hence, any comonotone Pareto optimal allocation will posses the same
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integrability/boundedness properties as the aggregate endowment W . In that sense, further
restricting the set of acceptable allocations by imposing additional integrability or even bound-
edness constraints in the formulation of problem (3.4) (or (3.3)) will yield the same comonotone
solutions as solving the unrestricted problem. ♦
3.3 Main Results
Let si := inf dom ui ∈ R ∪ {−∞}, i = 1, . . . , n, and diH := limx→si u′i(x) (which may be ∞)
and diL := limx→∞ u
′
i(x)(≥ 0) where u′ denotes the right-hand-derivative of u. Finally, let
N ⊂ {1, . . . , n} be the set of all indices such that diH = diL7, and M := {1, . . . , n} \N the set of
all indices such that diL < d
i
H . Note that N = ∅ or M = ∅ is possible.
In the following theorems we specify a non-empty set of Negishi weights (λ1, . . . , λn) for
which the associated optimization problem (3.4) admits a solution.
Theorem 3.8. Suppose that si > −∞, i = 1, . . . , n. Then for every set of strictly positive
weights λi > 0, i = 1, . . . , n, (3.4) admits a comonotone solution.
Theorem 3.9. Consider the following bounds on the weights λi, i = 1, . . . , n, and some δ > 0:
(3.6)
λi =
δ
diH
for all i ∈ N,
λid
i
L < δ < λid
i
H for all i ∈M.
We consider two cases:
(i) Suppose that N = ∅ or |N | = 1. Then (3.4) admits a comonotone solution for every set
of weights λi > 0, i = 1, . . . , n, satisfying the constraints (3.6).
(ii) Suppose that |N | ≥ 2. If si = −∞ for all i ∈ N , and Uj(−W−) > −∞ for all j ∈ N
such that cj ∈ R, then (3.4) admits a comonotone solution for every set of weights λi > 0,
i = 1, . . . , n, satisfying the constraints (3.6). In particular, if |N | = n, the solutions are
given up to a reallocation of cash. That is, if (X1, . . . , Xn) is a solution to (3.4) for some
given weights, then also (X1 + m1, . . . , Xn + mn) is a solution to (3.4) with that weights
whenever the numbers mi ∈ R satisfy
∑n
i=1mi = 0 and (X1 +m1, . . . , Xn+mn) ∈ Ac(W ).
7When diL = d
i
H = d
i and si = −∞ (i.e. dom ui = R), then the corresponding robust utility Ui is cash additive
in the sense that Ui(X + m) = Ui(X) + dim for all m ∈ R and X ∈ L1 and thus corresponds to a convex risk
measure (if di = 1 and multiplied by −1).
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We remark that when N = ∅, the two conditions in (3.6) reduce to the last one. Note that
Dana (2011) derives similar bounds on the weights λi given in (3.6) in her setting. The proofs of
Theorems 3.8 and 3.9 are provided in Appendix C. Theorem 3.9 is discussed in several examples
in Section 5.2 in which we illustrate that if we drop one of the conditions on the weights stated
in (3.6), we cannot in general expect the existence of solutions to (3.3) any longer.
If diH = ∞ and diL = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n, then the bounds in (3.6) are void. Hence,
Theorem 3.9 (i) implies the following Corollary.
Corollary 3.10. If diH =∞ and diL = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n (as for instance when the decision
makers’ utilities ui are chosen amongst the exponential, logarithmic or power utilities), then there
exists a comonotone solution to (3.4) for any set of strictly positive weights λi > 0, i = 1, . . . , n.
As regards the uniqueness of Pareto optimal allocations, we have the following result. To
this end we recall that a function U : L1 → R∪{−∞} is strictly concave if U(λX + (1−λ)Y ) >
λU(X) + (1− λ)U(Y ) whenever λ ∈ (0, 1) and X 6= Y .
Corollary 3.11. Suppose that under the conditions stated in Theorem 3.8 (and Theorem 3.9,
respectively) (n−1) among the n law invariant robust utilities Ui are strictly concave. Then, for
any given set of weights λi > 0, i = 1, . . . , n, (and satisfying the bounds (3.6), respectively), the
Pareto optimal allocation which solves the optimization problem (3.4) associated to (λ1, . . . , λn)
is unique and comonotone.
Proof. For any given vector of positive weights (λ1, . . . , λn) the set of solutions to the associated
optimization problem (3.4) is convex because the Ui are concave. This together with the strict
concavity of (n− 1) robust utilities implies that the solution to (3.4), if it exists, is unique.
4 Conclusion: The Existence Theorem
Proposition 3.2 and Theorems 3.8 and 3.9 immediately imply the existence of acceptable comono-
tone Pareto optimal allocations. This is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. (i) If si > −∞ for all i = 1, . . . , n, then there exists an acceptable comonotone
Pareto optimal allocation.
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(ii) If |N | ≤ 1, then there exists an acceptable comonotone Pareto optimal allocation.
(iii) Suppose that |N | ≥ 2. If si = −∞ for all i ∈ N , and Uj(−W−) > −∞ for all j ∈ N such
that cj ∈ R, then there exists an acceptable comonotone Pareto optimal allocation.
Moreover, in the situation of (iii), if |N | = n, then the Pareto optimal allocations have the
property of being up to a reallocation of cash. That is, if (X1, . . . , Xn) is a Pareto optimal
allocation of W , then also (X1 +m1, . . . , Xn +mn) is a Pareto optimal allocation whenever the
numbers mi ∈ R satisfy
∑n
i=1mi = 0 and (X1 +m1, . . . , Xn +mn) ∈ Ac(W ).
5 Examples
5.1 Yaari Preferences Versus Multiplier Preferences
Suppose that decision maker 1 has Yaari (1987) type preferences represented by the robust
utility
(5.1) U1(X) = 1
α
∫ α
0
qX(s) ds, X ∈ L1,
where α ∈ (0, 1) and qX(s) := inf{x : P(X ≤ x) ≥ s} with s ∈ (0, 1) being the quantile function
of X. Note that −U1 is the well-known Average Value at Risk (AVaR), that is
U1(X) = −AVaRα(X) = min
Q∈Q1
EQ[X] = min
Q∈Q1
∫ 1
0
qX(s)q dQ
dP
(1− s) ds
where Q1 := {Q P | dQdP ≤ 1α}; see e.g. Fo¨llmer and Schied (2004) Theorems 4.47 and 4.54. As
for decision maker 2, her probabilistic sophisticated variational preferences are represented by a
law invariant robust utility U2 as in (2.1) satisfying some additional properties which are listed
in Proposition 5.2. Examples of such robust utilities are multiplier preferences or semi-deviation
utilities with any strictly increasing utility u2 : R→ R.
Our case study is inspired by and extends an example in Jouini et al. (2008), Proposition
3.2. In Jouini et al. (2008) U2 is required to be a monetary utility, i.e. cash additive (u2 ≡ IdR).
Proposition 5.2 below shows that the functional form of the Pareto optimal allocations obtained
in Jouini et al. (2008) stays the same also when we allow for a larger class of preferences for
the second agent. The proof of Proposition 5.2 is essentially the same as in Jouini et al. (2008).
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For the sake of completeness we provide it in Section D. Before giving the result, we recall the
definition of strict risk aversion conditional on lower-tail events.
Definition 5.1. (i) Let X ∈ L1 and A ∈ F with P(A) > 0. The set A is a lower tail-event for
X if ess infAX < ess supAX ≤ ess infAc X where ess infAX := sup{m ∈ R | P(X > m |
A) = 1} (sup ∅ := −∞) and ess supAX := inf{m ∈ R | P(X ≤ m | A) = 1} (inf ∅ :=∞).
(ii) A function U : L1 → R ∪ {−∞} is strictly risk averse conditional on lower tail-events if
U(X) < U(X1Ac + E[X | A]1A) for every X ∈ dom U and any set A which is a lower
tail-event for X.
Proposition 5.2. Let decision maker 1 be represented by (5.1) and decision maker 2 by a law
invariant robust utility
U2(X) = inf
Q∈Q
(EQ[u2(X)] + α2(Q))
as in (2.1) with the following additional properties
• dom U2 = dom U2 + R,
• U2 is strictly monotone, i.e. X ≥ Y and P(X > Y ) > 0 implies U2(X) > U2(Y ),
• U2 is strictly risk averse conditional on lower-tail events.
Given any initial endowments Wi ∈ dom Ui, i = 1, 2, and c1, c2 ∈ R∪{∞} such that Ac(W ) 6= ∅,
the comonotone Pareto optimal allocations of the aggregate endowment W = W1 + W2 are of
the following form
(X1, X2) = (−(W − l)− + k,W ∨ l − k) where l ∈ R ∪ {−∞}(5.2)
and k ∈ R with k ≥ U1(W1)− U1(−(W − l)−)− c1.
If U2 is in addition strictly concave, then according to Corollary 3.11 all Pareto optimal
allocations are comonotone and of shape (5.2).
5.2 Examples Illustrating the Bounds (3.6)
Since our examples will only involve two decision makers and as the bounds (3.6) are determined
by the limiting case with trivial individual constraints, in the following we give a version of
Theorem 3.9 for two decision makers with c1 = c2 =∞ .
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Theorem 5.3. Suppose n = 2. We consider two cases:
(i) Suppose that diL < d
i
H for at least one i ∈ {1, 2}. If the weights λ1 > 0 and λ2 > 0 satisfy
(5.3)
λ2
λ1
∈
(
d1L
d2H
,
d1H
d2L
)
,
then there exists a comonotone solution to (3.3).8
(ii) Suppose that d1H = d
1
L, d
2
H = d
2
L, s1 = s2 = −∞. If λi = δdiH , i = 1, 2, for some δ > 0,
then there exists a comonotone solution to (3.3).
Example 5.4. Illustration of Theorem 5.3 (i) and of the differences between (3.3) and (3.4):
Let U1(X) = E[dLX+ − dHX−] and U2(X) := E[X], X ∈ L1, where 0 < dL < 1 < dH . Suppose
that W ≥ 0. If λ2λ1 < dL, consider the allocations (W + k,−k) ∈ A(W ), k ∈ R+. Then
λ1U1(W + k) + λ2U2(−k) = λ1E[dL(W + k)]− λ2k
= λ1E[dLW ] + (λ1dL − λ2)k →∞ for k →∞
because λ1dL − λ2 > 0. Hence, (3.3) admits no solution. Analogously, (3.3) admits no solution
in case λ2λ1 > dH . However for
λ2
λ1
∈ [dL, dH ] the comonotone allocation (0,W ) solves (3.3). Now
suppose for simplicity that W = 0 and that ci ∈ R for i = 1, 2. By Proposition 3.6 we only need
to consider the comonotone allocations (−k, k), k ∈ R, when solving (3.4). Since acceptability
implies that k must be bounded (for instance k ≤ c1/dH if k ≥ 0), (3.4) admits a solution for
any λi > 0, i = 1, 2. This solution obviously depends on how far we can push k in an optimal
direction, hence on the constraints ci. Apparently, all allocations (−k, k), k ∈ R, are Pareto
optimal and also acceptable for some ci. Also note that if c1 =∞ and c2 ∈ R, then (3.4) admits
a solution if and only if λ2λ1 ≤ dH while if c1 ∈ R and c2 = ∞ there is a solution to (3.4) if and
only if λ2λ1 ≥ dL. ♦
Notice that in Example 5.4 there exists a solution to (3.3) even if λ2λ1 equals one of the bounds
given in (5.3). However, if the robust utility of one of the decision makers is strictly concave,
then often (3.3) admits no solution at the interval bounds of (5.3) either:
8Here 0∞ := 0 and
∞
0
:=∞.
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Example 5.5. Illustration of Theorem 5.3 (i): Let W = 0 and consider two utility functions
u1 and u2 with d
i
H < ∞ and diL > 0, i = 1, 2. Let Ui(X) := E[ui(X)], X ∈ L1. Suppose that
u′2(a) = d2L +
1
2
√
a
for large a > 0 (in particular u′2 does not attain d2L) and that u
′
1(−a) = d1H
for a > 0. Then for λ2λ1 =
d1H
d2L
and some constant k > 0 we have
sup
a∈R
λ1U1(−a) + λ2U2(a) = sup
a∈R
λ1u1(−a) + λ2u2(a) ≥ sup
a≥0
λ2
√
a+ k =∞.
Similar arguments show that in general we cannot expect the existence of solutions to (3.3) in
case λ2λ1 equals the lower bound
d1L
d2H
either. ♦
Example 5.6. Illustration of Theorem 5.3 (ii): Suppose that u1(x) = d
1x and u2(x) = d
2x for
some d1, d2 > 0. If λ2λ1 6= d
1
d2
, then (λ1d
1 − λ2d2) 6= 0 and considering the allocations of type
(W + k,−k) ∈ A(W ) for some constant k yields
sup
k∈R
λ1U1(W + k) + λ2U2(−k) = λ1U1(W ) + λ2U2(0) + sup
k∈R
(λ1d
1 − λ2d2)k =∞.
Hence, (3.3) admits no solution. ♦
5.3 (Non-)Existence of Pareto Optima in case the Decision Makers are not
Probabilistic Sophisticated with respect to the same Reference Measure
Consider two decision makers with expected utility choice criteria U1(X) = EP[u1(X)] and
U2(X) = EP˜[u2(X)], X ∈ L∞, where the probability measures P˜ and P are equivalent but not
equal, and ui : R → R are utility functions with ui(0) = 0, i = 1, 2. Notice that the decision
makers are probabilistic sophisticated in different worlds, i.e. with respect to different reference
probabilities. Hence there is  > 0 such that the sets A := {dP˜dP ≥ 1 + } and B := {dP˜dP ≤ 1− }
have positive probability (under P). Suppose that c1 = c2 = ∞ and that (Y1, Y2) ∈ A(0) is
a Pareto optimal allocation. According to Lemma 3.3 - which does not rely on probabilistic
sophistication - if the ui are ‘nice’, then (Y1, Y2) is the solution to
λ1U1(Y1) + λ2U2(Y2) = sup
Y ∈L1
λ1U1(−Y ) + λ2U2(Y )
for some weights λi > 0, i = 1, 2. However,
λ1U1(Y1) + λ2U2(Y2) ≥ sup
t>0
λ1EP[u1(−t1A)] + λ2EP
[
u2(t1A)
dP˜
dP
]
≥ sup
t>0
(λ1u1(−t) + λ2(1 + )u2(t))P(A)(5.4)
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and similarly
λ1U1(Y1) + λ2U2(Y2) ≥ sup
t>0
λ1EP[u1(t1B)] + λ2EP
[
u2(−t1B)dP˜
dP
]
≥ sup
t>0
(λ1u1(t) + λ2(1− )u2(−t))P(B).(5.5)
Now it is easy to construct situations in which (5.4) or (5.5) explode and thus contradict the
Pareto optimality of (Y1, Y2). If for instance d
i
L > 0 and d
i
H <∞ for i = 1, 2, then
(5.6) (5.4) ≥ sup
t>0
(λ2(1 + )d
2
L − λ1d1H)P(A)t
and
(5.7) (5.5) ≥ sup
t>0
(λ1d
1
L − λ2(1− )d2H)P(B)t.
(5.6) or (5.7) explode apart from the case9
(5.8)
(1 + )d2L
d1H
≤ λ1
λ2
≤ (1− )d
2
H
d1L
.
So in particular we must have that
(5.9)
(1 + )d2L
d1H
≤ (1− )d
2
H
d1L
.
However, if e.g. 1 − /2 < diL ≤ diH < 1 + /2, i = 1, 2, then (5.9) is not satisfied which in the
end contradicts the Pareto optimality of (Y1, Y2).
But there are also cases in which Pareto optimal allocations exists. Suppose that there are
constants K > 1 > k > 0 such that k ≤ dP˜/dP ≤ K and suppose that u2 is such that d
2
H
d2L
≥ Kk .
The latter condition implies that u2 is concave enough in the sense that there is a utility function
u˜2 which dominates v(x) := ku2(x)1{x<0} + Ku2(x)1{x≥0}, x ∈ R. Indeed, as v is concave on
the half axises x < 0 and x ≥ 0 respectively, and by the requirement on the concavity of u2,
there are x0 < 0 and x1 > 0 and a joint constant L > 0 such that ku
′
2(x0) > Ku
′
2(x1) and
x 7→ ku′2(x0)x + L dominates v on x < 0 and x 7→ Ku′2(x1)x + L dominates v on x ≥ 0, so
u˜2(x) := Ku
′
2(x1)x
+ − ku′2(x0)x− + L does the job. Consequently for all W ∈ L1 and for any
9Note the similarity between the bounds in (5.8) and the bounds in (5.3).
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λ1, λ2 > 0 we have
sup
(X1,X2)∈A(W )
λ1U1(X1) + λ2U2(X2) = sup
(X1,X2)∈A(W )
λ1U1(X1) + λ2EP
[
u2(X2)
dP˜
dP
]
(5.10)
≤ sup
(X1,X2)∈A(W )
λ1U1(X1) + λ2EP [v(X2)]
≤ sup
(X1,X2)∈A(W )
λ1U1(X1) + λ2EP [u˜2(X2)] .(5.11)
Since U˜2(·) := EP [u˜2(·)] is of type (2.1) we know that (5.11) is bounded and admits a comonotone
solution if λ1, λ2 satisfy the conditions stated in Theorem 5.3. Now it is easy to construct
situations in which the above inequalities are indeed equalities, and solutions to (5.11) thus
coincide with solutions to the left hand side of (5.10). Suppose for instance that dP˜dP = k1B+K1Bc
for some set B ∈ F with P(B) = K−1K−k , and that u2(x) = d2Lx+ − d2Hx−. Then we may choose
u˜2(x) = v(x) = Kd
2
Lx
+−kd2Hx−. Depending on u1, any situation in which the extreme allocation
(W, 0) is a solution to (5.11) (like in Example 5.4), this allocation obviously also solves the left
hand side of (5.10). Furthermore, whenever there is a solution (Y1, Y2) to (5.11) such that
B = {Y2 ≤ 0}, the allocation (Y1, Y2) solves (5.10) too, because then u2(Y2)dP˜dP = u˜2(Y2).
Apparently, if P˜ 6= P, the existence of Pareto optima depends on parameters such as the deviation
of the measures P and P˜ from each other relative to the concavity of the utilities ui. Hence,
if the decision makers are not probabilistic sophisticated with respect to the same reference
probability measure, then existence results like Theorem 4.1 do not hold in general any longer.
A Proof of Lemma 2.3
In the proof of Lemma 2.3 and Theorems 3.8 and 3.9 we will apply the following facts about
law invariant monetary utilities which apart from the sign are convex risk measures.
Lemma A.1. Let
U(X) = inf
Q∈Q
(EQ[u(X)] + α(Q)) , X ∈ L1,
be a law invariant robust utility as (2.1). Define
(A.1) U(X) := inf
Q∈Q
(EQ [X] + α(Q)) , X ∈ L1,
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so that U(·) = U(u(·)). Then, U is a proper, law invariant, ssd-monotone, upper semi-
continuous, monotone, cash additive (U(X + m) = U(X) + m for all m ∈ R), and concave
function. Moreover, we have that
(A.2) U(X) ≤ E[X] + U(0) for all X ∈ L1.
Proof. We give a brief version of the proof since many of the presented arguments are standard
and can for instance be found in Fo¨llmer and Schied (2004). Cash additivity and monotonicity
are obvious by definition of U and properness follows from infQ∈Q α(Q) > −∞. Concavity and
upper semi-continuity follow from the fact that U is a point-wise infimum over continuous affine
functions. To see that U is law invariant we note that for X ∈ L1 and Z ∈ L∞ we have
(A.3) sup
Z˜
d
=Z
E[XZ˜] =
∫ 1
0
qX(s)qZ(s) ds
where qY (s) := inf{x | P(Y ≤ x) ≥ s} denotes the (left-continuous) quantile function of a ran-
dom variable Y . The relation (A.3) is a consequence of the (upper) Hardy-Littlewood inequality
and some analysis. A proof can be found in Fo¨llmer and Schied (2004), Lemma 4.55, or in a
slightly more general version in Svindland (2010b), Lemma C.2. As e.g. in the proof of Fo¨llmer
and Schied (2004), Theorem 4.54, by (A.3) and law invariance of Q and α we obtain that
U(X) = inf
Q∈Q
(
E
[
dQ
dP
X
]
+ α(Q)
)
= inf
Q∈Q
inf
Q˜ d=Q
(
E
[
dQ˜
dP
X
]
+ α(Q˜)
)
= inf
Q∈Q
−
sup
Q˜ d=Q
E
[
−dQ˜
dP
X
]+ α(Q)

= inf
Q∈Q
(∫ 1
0
−q−X(s)q dQ
dP
(s) ds+ α(Q)
)
= inf
Q∈Q
(∫ 1
0
qX(1− s)q dQ
dP
(s) ds+ α(Q)
)
in which, with some abuse of notation, we write Q˜ d= Q instead of dQ˜dP
d
= dQdP and use the fact
that qX(1− s) = −q−X(s) for almost all s ∈ (0, 1). Clearly, the last term in the equations only
depends on the distribution of X under P. Hence, the law invariance follows. According to Dana
(2005), Theorem 4.1, an upper semi-continuous monotone concave function is law invariant if
and only if it is ssd-monotone as defined in Lemma 2.3 (iv). The final statement follows from
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the fact that E[X] ssd X by Jensen’s inequality for concave functions. Thus ssd-monotonicity
and cash additivity imply that U(X) ≤ U(E[X]) = E[X] + U(0).
Proof of Lemma 2.3. Let
U(X) := inf
Q∈Q
(EQ[u(X)] + α(Q)) , X ∈ L1,
as in (2.1) and let U be defined as in Lemma A.1 such that U(·) = U(u(·)).
(i): This follows from Jensen’s inequality for concave functions and the fact that by definition
dom u 6= ∅ and infQ∈Q α(Q) > −∞.
(ii): is obvious.
(iii): This follows from the concavity of u and the monotonicity and concavity of U .
(iv): According Dana (2005), Theorem 4.1, an upper semi-continuous monotone concave function
is law invariant if and only if it is ssd-monotone. The upper semi-continuity of U is proved in
the next item.
(v): Let k ∈ R and (Xn)n∈N ⊂ Ek := {X ∈ L1 | U(X) ≥ k} be a sequence converging in
(L1, ‖ · ‖1) to some X. Then we may choose a subsequence which we also denote by (Xn)n∈N
which converges P-a.s. to X too. We consider the following two cases: either the right-hand
derivative u′ of u is bounded on the domain of u or it is unbounded. In the first case, if the
right-hand derivative u′ of u is bounded on the domain of u, let C > 0 such that u′(x) ≤ C for
all x ∈ dom u. The right continuity of u implies that in this case dom u is closed in R. Since
Xn ∈ dom U for all n ∈ N, we must have that Xn ∈ dom u P-a.s. for all n ∈ N (see (A.2)) and
therefore X ∈ dom u P-a.s. Monotonicity and concavity of u imply that
|u(Xn)− u(X)| ≤ (u′(X) ∨ u′(Xn))|Xn −X| ≤ C|Xn −X|.
Hence, we conclude that the sequence u(Xn) converges to u(X) in L
1, and by upper semi-
continuity of U we infer that
U(X) = U(u(X)) ≥ lim sup
n→∞
U(u(Xn)) ≥ k,
so Ek is closed. Now suppose that u
′ is unbounded on the domain of u. Then there ex-
ists a strictly decreasing sequence (ar)r∈N ⊂ dom u such that u′(a1) > 0, u′(ar) < ∞, and
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limr→∞ u′(ar) =∞. By the same arguments as presented in the first case the sequence u(Xn∨ar)
converges in L1 to u(X∨ar), because u′ is bounded on [ar,∞] and (Xn∨ar)n∈N converges P-a.s.
and in (L1, ‖·‖1) to X∨ar. Hence, by upper semi-continuity and monotonicity of U (Lemma A.1)
as well as monotonicity of u we obtain
U(X ∨ ar) = U(u(X ∨ ar)) ≥ lim sup
n→∞
U(u(Xn ∨ ar)) ≥ lim sup
n→∞
U(u(Xn)) ≥ k.
Now let a := limr→∞ ar ≥ −∞. Then dom u ⊂ [a,∞), and Xn ≥ a P-a.s., because Xn ∈ dom U .
Hence, X = limn→∞Xn ≥ a P-a.s. too and thus limr→∞X ∨ ar = X. Moreover, by right-
continuity and monotonicity of u we have limr→∞ u(X ∨ ar) = u(X) monotonously. Therefore,
we infer from applying the monotone convergence theorem that
U(X) = inf
Q∈Q
(EQ[u(X)] + α(Q)) = inf
Q∈Q
lim
r→∞ (EQ[u(X ∨ ar)] + α(Q))
≥ lim sup
r→∞
inf
Q∈Q
(EQ[u(X ∨ ar)] + α(Q)) = lim sup
r→∞
U(X ∨ ar)
≥ k.
Hence, also in this case Ek is closed, so U is upper semi-continuous.
B Proof of Proposition 3.2
We prove the case of Pareto optima. For acceptable Pareto optima in what follows simply
replace A(W ) by Ac(W ).
Now let (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ A(W ) be Pareto Optimal. Then the non-empty convex sets
C := {(U1(X1), . . . ,Un(Xn))}
and
V = {(U1(Y1), . . . ,Un(Yn)) | (Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ A(W )} − Rn++
in Rn, where Rn++ := {(y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Rn | yi > 0, i = 1, . . . , n}, have empty intersection due
to the Pareto optimality of (X1, . . . , Xn). Hence, there exists a non-trivial linear functional
(λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ Rn such that
(B.1)
n∑
i=1
λiUi(Xi) ≥
n∑
i=1
λi(Ui(Y1)− yi)
23
for all (Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ A(W ) and (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Rn++; see Rockafellar (1974), Theorem 11.2. We
infer that λi ≥ 0 for all i because otherwise choosing yi >> 0 would yield a contradiction. The
last assertion of Proposition 3.2 is obvious.
C Proofs of Theorems 3.8 and 3.9
The next Lemma C.1 is an Arzela-Ascoli type argument which will also play a crucial role in
the proof of Theorems 3.8 and 3.9. For a proof see e.g. Filipovic´ and Svindland (2008).
Lemma C.1. Let fn : R → R, n ∈ N, be a sequence of increasing 1-Lipschitz-continuous
functions such that fn(0) ∈ [−K,K] for all n ∈ N where K ≥ 0 is a constant. Then there is a
subsequence (fnk)k∈N of (fn)n∈N and an increasing 1-Lipschitz-continuous function f : R → R
such that limk→∞ fnk(x) = f(x) for all x ∈ R.
Let CFN := {(fi)ni=1 ∈ CF | f1(0) = . . . = fn(0) = 0}. Note that
CF = {(fi + ai)ni=1 | (fi)ni=1 ∈ CFN, ai ∈ R,
n∑
i=1
ai = 0}.
According to Proposition 3.6 there exists a solution to (3.4) for some given weights (λ1, . . . , λn)
if and only if there is a solution to
Maximize
n∑
i=1
λiUi(fi(W ) + ai) subject to (fi)ni=1 ∈ CFN, ai ∈ R,(C.1)
n∑
i=1
ai = 0, (fi(W ) + ai)
n
i=1 ∈ Ac(W ).
Proof of Theorem 3.9. We will prove the existence of a solution to (C.1). Fix a set of weights
(λ1, . . . , λn) satisfying the conditions (3.6). First of all, we observe that if for some j ∈ M
the right-hand-derivative u′j does not attain the values d
j
H and/or d
j
L, we can always find non-
negative numbers d˜jH and/or d˜
j
L in the image of u
′
j such that, for the already given set of weights
(λ1, . . . , λn), the conditions (3.6) still hold true if we replace the d
j
H and/or d
j
L by d˜
j
H and/or d˜
j
H .
We assume that all djH and/or d
j
L which are not attained by the corresponding u
′
j are replaced
as in the described manner, and for the sake of simplicity we keep the notation djH and d
j
L.
By concavity of the ui there is a constant k such that for all i = 1, . . . , n the affine functions
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R 3 x 7→ diLx+ k and R 3 x 7→ diHx+ k both dominate ui10. Using this, we will show that
P := sup
{ n∑
i=1
λiUi(fi(W ) + ai) | (fi)ni=1 ∈ CFN, ai ∈ R,(C.2)
n∑
i=1
ai = 0, (fi(W ) + ai)
n
i=1 ∈ Ac(W )
}
<∞,
and that this supremum is realized over a bounded set of comonotone allocations where the
bound is given by W . More precisely, we will prove that there exists some constant K > 0
depending on W such that
P = sup
{ n∑
i=1
λiUi(fi(W ) + ai) | (fi)ni=1 ∈ CFN, ai ∈ [−K,K],(C.3)
n∑
i=1
ai = 0, (fi(W ) + ai)
n
i=1 ∈ Ac(W )
}
.
To this end, we define the functions
Ui(X) := inf
Q∈Qi
(EQ[X] + αi(Q)) , X ∈ L1, i = 1, . . . , n,
as in Lemma A.1. Consider (fi)
n
i=1 ∈ CFN and ai ∈ R such that
∑n
i=1 ai = 0 and (fi(W ) +
ai)
n
i=1 ∈ Ac(W ). Let I := {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | ai < 0} and J := {1, . . . , n} \ I. By applying
10Note that if u is a concave function, then it is always dominated by x 7→ u′(y)(x− y) + u(y).
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monotonicity, cash additivity and finally property (A.2) of the Ui (see Lemma A.1) we obtain:
n∑
i=1
λiUi(fi(W ) + ai) =
n∑
i=1
λiUi(ui(fi(W ) + ai))
≤
∑
i∈I∩M
λiUi(d
i
H(fi(W ) + ai) + k) +
∑
j∈J∩M
λjUj(d
j
L(fj(W ) + aj) + k)+∑
l∈N
λlUl(d
l
H(fl(W ) + al) + k)
≤ k
n∑
i=1
λi +
∑
i∈I∩M
λiUi(d
i
Hfi(W ))+∑
j∈J∩M
λjUj(d
j
Lfj(W )) +
∑
l∈N
λlUl(d
l
Hfl(W ))+(
min
i∈I∩M
λid
i
H
) ∑
i∈I∩M
ai +
(
max
j∈J∩M
λjd
j
L
) ∑
j∈J∩M
aj + δ
∑
l∈N
al
≤ k
n∑
i=1
λi + E[W+]
n∑
i=1
λid
i
H +
n∑
i=1
λiUi(0)+(
min
i∈I∩M
λid
i
H
) ∑
i∈I∩M
ai +
(
max
j∈J∩M
λjd
j
L
) ∑
j∈J∩M
aj + δ
∑
l∈N
al.(C.4)
Suppose that N = ∅, then we further estimate
(C.5) (C.4) ≤ E[W+]
n∑
i=1
λid
i
H + k
n∑
i=1
λi +
n∑
i=1
λiUi(0)−
(
min
i∈I
λid
i
H −max
j∈J
λjd
j
L
)
a
where a :=
∑
i∈J ai (≥ 0). If N 6= ∅ and
∑
l∈N al < 0, then we estimate
(C.6) (C.4) ≤ E[W+]
n∑
i=1
λid
i
H + k
n∑
i=1
λi +
n∑
i=1
λiUi(0)−
(
δ − max
j∈J∩M
λjd
j
L
)
a˜
for a˜ :=
∑
i∈J∩M ai (≥ 0) using (3.6). And similarly, if N 6= ∅ and
∑
l∈N al ≥ 0, then we estimate
(C.7) (C.4) ≤ E[W+]
n∑
i=1
λid
i
H + k
n∑
i=1
λi +
n∑
i=1
λiUi(0)−
(
min
i∈I∩M
λid
i
H − δ
)
aˆ
for aˆ :=
∑
i∈J∪N ai (≥ 0). Consequently we infer that
P ≤ E[W+]
n∑
i=1
λid
i
H + k
n∑
i=1
λi +
n∑
i=1
λiUi(0) <∞.
Choose any allocation (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ Ac(W ) (Assumption 3.1). Then we have that P ≥∑n
i=1 λiUi(Xi) =: k˜. Letting
A := min
i=1,...,n
λid
i
H − max
j=1,...,n
λjd
j
L
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if N = ∅, or
A := min
{(
δ −max
j∈M
λjd
j
L
)
,
(
min
i∈M
λid
i
H − δ
)}
if N 6= ∅, we infer from (C.5), (C.6), and (C.7) that the supremum in (C.2) is realized over
allocations such that
|ai| ≤ |k˜|+ E[W
+]
∑n
i=1 λid
i
H + k
∑n
i=1 λi + |
∑n
i=1 λiUi(0)|
A
=: K
for all i ∈ M , and |∑i∈N ai| ≤ K too. Note that A > 0 due to the conditions (3.6) on the
weights λi. In the following we argue that in case |N | > 1 we may also assume that the ai
belonging to i ∈ N are bounded due to the insensitivity of the cash additive Ui, i ∈ N , to
constant re-sharings of 0 amongst themselves. To this end note that the choice of the λi and
the requirement si = −∞ for i ∈ N implies
(C.8)
∑
i∈N
λiUi(fi(W ) + ai +mi) =
∑
i∈N
λiUi(fi(W ) + ai) + δ
∑
i∈N
mi =
∑
i∈N
λiUi(fi(W ) + ai),
whenever mi ∈ R such that
∑
i∈N mi = 0. Hence, adding constants mi such that
∑
i∈N mi = 0
to the endowments of the decision makers in N does not affect the contribution of the allocation
to P . This immediately implies that we may assume |ai| ≤ K for all i ∈ N if ci = ∞ for all
i ∈ N , because in that case we may choose m1 =
∑
i∈N ai − a1 and mi = −ai for all i 6= 1 in
(C.8), and the altered allocation satisfies the bound (|m1 + a1| = |
∑
i∈N ai| ≤ K, see above). If
the set Nb ⊂ N of indices i ∈ N such that ci ∈ R is not empty, we also need to consider cash
amounts that might be needed to make the endowment fi(W ) +ai acceptable. This is the point
where the assumption Ui(−W−) > −∞ for all i ∈ Nb enters (whenever |N | > 1). Using the cash
additivity (Ui(Y + z) = Ui(Y ) + diHz, z ∈ R) and monotonicity of Ui we obtain that fi(W ) + z
is acceptable for decision maker i ∈ Nb whenever
z ≥ Ui(Wi)− Ui(−W
−)− ci
diH
.
Moreover, acceptability of fi(W ) + ai implies (again using cash additivity and monotonicity of
Ui) for all i ∈ Nb:
ai ≥ Ui(Wi)− ci − Ui(fi(Wi))
diH
≥ Ui(Wi)− ci − Ui(0)
diH
− E[W+]
where we have used that Ui(fi(Wi)) ≤ Ui(W+) ≤ E[diHW+]+Ui(0) according to (A.2). Therefore
we know that there exists a joint constant K̂ > 0 such that the ai, i ∈ Nb, are bounded
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from below by −K̂ and such that the endowments f(Wi) + ai + mi stay acceptable for mi =
−[(ai− K̂)∨ 0], i ∈ Nb. If Nb = N , then choosing some j ∈ Nb and letting mi = −[(ai− K̂)∨ 0]
for i ∈ Nb \ {j} and mj = −
∑
i∈N\{j}mi, we obtain that
∑
i∈N mi = 0, |ai + mi| ≤ K̂ for all
i ∈ Nb \ {j}, and
|aj +mj | ≤ |
∑
i∈N
ai|+ |
∑
i∈Nb\{j}
ai +mi| ≤ K + |Nb|K̂ =: K.
Moreover, since aj ≤ aj + mj , also f(Wj) + aj + mj is acceptable, i.e. Uj(f(Wj) + aj + mj) ≥
Uj(Wj) − cj . If |Nu| > 1 where Nu := N \ Nb, then we choose some j ∈ Nu and let mi =
−[(ai − K̂) ∨ 0] for all i ∈ Nb and mi = −ai for all i ∈ Nu \ {j}, whereas mj = −
∑
i∈N\{j}mi.
Again,
∑
i∈N mi = 0, and ai +mi = 0 for all i ∈ Nu \ {j}, |ai +mi| ≤ K̂ for all i ∈ Nb, and
|aj +mj | ≤ |
∑
i∈N
ai|+ |
∑
i∈Nb
ai +mi| ≤ K + |Nb|K̂ =: K.
Hence, (C.2) and (C.3) are proved. By virtue of (C.3) we may choose a sequence ((fpi )
n
i=1)p∈N ⊂
CF with fpi (0) ∈ [−K,K] for all i = 1, . . . , n and p ∈ N such that (fpi (W ))ni=1 ∈ Ac(W ) for all
p ∈ N and
P = lim
p→∞
n∑
i=1
λiUi(fpi (W )).
According to Lemma C.1 there exists a subsequence, which we for the sake of simplicity also
denote by (fpi )
n
i=1, which converges pointwise to some (fi)
n
i=1 ∈ CF. As |fpi (W )| ≤ |W | + K
for all i = 1, . . . , n and p ∈ N, we may apply the dominated convergence theorem which yields
fi(W ) ∈ L1, and limp→∞ E[|fi(W )− fpi (W )|] = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. By upper semi-continuity
of the Ui (Lemma 2.3) we have
Ui(Wi)− ci ≤ lim sup
p→∞
Ui(fpi (W )) ≤ Ui(fi(W )),
and
P = lim
p→∞
n∑
i=1
λiUi(fpi (W )) ≤
n∑
i=1
λi lim sup
p→∞
Ui(fpi (W ))
≤
n∑
i=1
λiUi(fi(W )).
Hence, we infer that (fi(W ))
n
i=1 ∈ Ac(W ) (since P > −∞) and
P =
n∑
i=1
λiUi(fi(W )).
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For the last part of (ii) suppose that |N | = n, and let (X1, . . . , Xn) be a solution to (3.4) for the
given weights. If mi ∈ R such that
∑n
i=1mi = 0, then the same computation as in (C.8) yields∑n
i=1 λiUi(Xi +mi) =
∑n
i=1 λiUi(Xi).
Proof of Theorem 3.8. Recall (C.1) and let (fi)
n
i=1 ∈ CFN, ai ∈ R with
∑n
i=1 ai = 0 such
that (fi(W ) + ai)
n
i=1 ∈ Ac(W ). Since in particular Ui(fi(W ) + ai) > −∞, we must have that
fi(W ) + ai ≥ si for all i = 1, . . . , n. Let K˜ :=
∑n
i=1 |si|. Then
−(|W |+ K˜) ≤ fi(W ) + ai = W − (
∑
j 6=i
fj(W ) + aj) ≤ |W |+ K˜.
Hence, we deduce that (C.3) holds with K := 2 essinf |W |+K˜. The rest of the proof now follows
the lines of the proof of Theorem 3.9.
D Proof of Proposition 5.2
For the proof of Proposition 5.2 we will need some (additional) tools from convex duality theory
which we briefly introduce in the following. The details and proofs of the statements can e.g.
be found in Ekeland and Te´man (1999). Let U be a law invariant robust utility as in (2.1). The
dual function of U is
U∗(Z) := sup
Y ∈L1
U(Y )− E[Y Z], Z ∈ L∞,
which is convex and σ(L∞, L1)-lower semi-continuous, i.e. the level sets Ek := {Z ∈ L∞ |
U∗(Z) ≤ k} are closed in the σ(L∞, L1)-topology for all k ∈ R. Moreover, U∗ is law invariant
by the same arguments as applied in the proof of Lemma A.1 (−U∗ is concave and upper semi-
continuous) and therefore U∗ is c-antitone according to Dana (2005), Theorem 4.1. Since U is
concave and upper semi-continuous (Lemma 2.3), it follows from the Fenchel-Moreau theorem
that
(D.1) U(X) = U∗∗(X) := inf
Z∈L∞
E[ZX] + U∗(Z), X ∈ L1.
Again the very same techniques as in the proof of Lemma A.1 show that U is law invariant if
and only if U∗ is law invariant. The superdifferential of U at some X ∈ L1 is
∂U(X) := {Z ∈ L∞ | U(Y ) ≤ U(X) + E[Z(Y −X)]∀Y ∈ L1}.
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Notice that
(D.2) Z ∈ ∂U(X) ⇔ U(X) = E[ZX] + U∗(Z)
and that monotonicity of U implies ∂U(X) ⊂ dom U∗ ⊂ L∞+ .
Lemma D.1. Let U be a law invariant robust utility as in (2.1) and let X ∈ L1 such that
∂U(X) 6= ∅. Then there exists a decreasing function h : R→ [0,∞) such that h(X) ∈ ∂U(X).
Proof. Let Z ∈ ∂U(X) and h : R → R+ be a measurable function such that h(X) = E[Z | X].
By (D.2), E[Z | X] c Z (Jensen’s inequality), c-antitonicity of U∗ and finally (D.1) it follows
that
U(X) = E[ZX] + U∗(Z) ≥ E[E[Z | X]X] + U∗(E[Z | X]) ≥ U(X).
Thus h(X) ∈ ∂U(X) too. Note that (A.3) and law invariance of U∗ imply
U(X) ≤
∫ 1
0
qh(X)(1− t)qX(t) dt+ U∗(h(X))
in the same way as the similar argument presented in the proof of Lemma A.1. Hence we obtain
that
U(X) ≤
∫ 1
0
qh(X)(1− t)qX(t) dt+ U∗(h(X))
≤ E[h(X)X] + U∗(h(X)) = U(X)
where we applied the Hardy-Littlewood inequalities in the second step; see Fo¨llmer and Schied
(2004) Theorem A.24. Consequently E[h(X)X] =
∫ 1
0 qh(X)(1− t)qX(t) dt which guarantees that
h might be chosen as to be decreasing; see again Fo¨llmer and Schied (2004) Theorem A.24.
Lemma D.2. Let U be a law invariant robust utility as in (2.1) which is strictly risk averse
conditional on lower-tail events. Let (X,Z) ∈ L1×L∞ be such that Z ∈ ∂U(X) and X = f(W ),
Z = h(W ) for some W ∈ L1 and an increasing function f : R → R and a decreasing function
h : R → R+. Consider the set A := {Z = ess supZ}. If P(A) > 0, then X is constant on the
set A.
Proof. Assume that P(A) > 0 and, by contradiction, that X is not constant on A. Since f is
increasing and h is decreasing A is a lower tail-event of X. As U is strictly risk averse conditional
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on lower-tail events it follows that
(D.3) U(X) < U(X)
where X = X1Ac + E[X | A]1A. But E[ZX] = E[ZX] and Z ∈ ∂U(X) imply U(X) ≤ U(X) +
E[Z(X −X)] = U(X) which contradicts (D.3).
Lemma D.3. Let U be a law invariant robust utility as in (2.1) which is in addition strictly
monotone on dom U and let (X,Z) ∈ L1 × L∞ such that Z ∈ ∂U(X). Then Z > 0 a.s.
Proof. Let A := {Z = 0}. As U(X + 1A) ≤ U(X) + E[Z1A] = U(X), strict monotonicity of U
implies P(A) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 5.2. In the following we may and will assume that c1 = c2 = ∞, because
any Pareto optimum remains optimal if we replace the rationality constraints by the trivial ones.
Given that we are only concerned about the shape of the allocation, the constraints ci do not
play any role apart from giving the bound on the constant k in (5.2). This bound in turn follows
from the translation invariance of U1 implying that
U1(X1) = U1(−(W − l)−) + k ≥ U1(W1)− c1.
Hence, let (X1, X2) ∈ A(W ) (where c1 = c2 =∞) be a comonotone Pareto optimal allocation
of W , and let f, g : R → R be increasing functions such that f + g = IdR and (X1, X2) =
(f(W ), g(W )). According to Lemma 3.4 there exists λ1 > 0 and λ2 > 0 such that
(D.4) λ1U1(X1) + λ2U2(X2) = max
(Y1,Y2)∈A(W )
λ1U1(Y1) + λ2U2(Y2).
Note that the function
Uλ1,λ2(Y ) := sup
(Y1,Y2)∈A(Y )
λ1U1(Y1) + λ2U2(Y2), Y ∈ L1,
is concave, increasing and
dom Uλ1,λ2 = dom U1 + dom U2 = L1 + dom U2 = L1.
Moreover Uλ1,λ2(·) ≥ λ1U1(·) + λ2U2(0) implies that there exists an open set in L1 on which
Uλ1,λ2 is bounded from below, because λ1U1 as a continuous concave function has this property;
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see Ekeland and Te´man (1999) Proposition 2.5. Hence Uλ1,λ2 is continuous on L1 and there-
fore everywhere superdifferentiable; see e.g. Ekeland and Te´man (1999) Proposition 2.5 and
Proposition 5.2. Uλ1,λ2 is also law invariant. This can be deduced by verifying that the dual
U∗λ1,λ2 = (λ1U1)∗ + (λ2U2)∗
is law invariant as a sum of law invariant functions; see also the introductory remarks of this
section. According to Lemma D.1 there exists a decreasing function h : R→ R+ such that
(D.5) Z := h(W ) ∈ ∂Uλ1,λ2(W ) = ∂λ1U1(X1) ∩ ∂λ2U2(X2).
The inclusion ⊂ in (D.5) is due to the fact that for all Z ∈ ∂Uλ1,λ2(W ) we have that
Uλ1,λ2(Y ) ≤ Uλ1,λ2(W ) + E[Z(Y −W )] for all Y ∈ L1
and thus by (D.4) and definition of Uλ1,λ2 that
λ1U1(Y1) + λ2U2(Y2) ≤ λ1U1(X1) + λ2U2(X2) + E[Z(Y1 + Y2 − (X1 +X2))]
for all Y1, Y2 ∈ L1. Now Z ∈ ∂λiUi(Xi), i = 1, 2, follows. The converse inclusion in (D.5) follows
similarly. By definition of the supergradient, this implies that Zλ1 ∈ ∂U1(X1) and Zλ2 ∈ ∂U2(X2).
From Zλ2 ∈ ∂U2(X2) and the strict monotonicity of U2 it follows that P (Z = 0) = 0; see Lemma
D.3. Note that
U1(Y ) =
∫ 1
0
qY (t) dϕ(t), Y ∈ L1,
where ϕ(t) := tα ∧ 1 for t ∈ [0, 1] is an increasing continuous (on (0, 1)) function. Since Zλ1 ∈
∂U1(X1) we have also that
U1(X1) =
∫ 1
0
qX1(t)q Z
λ1
(1− t) dt =
∫ 1
0
qX1(t) dψ(t)
where ψ(t) := 1λ1
∫ t
0 qZ(1− s) ds, t ∈ [0, 1], is another increasing continuous function. Hence, we
obtain that ∫ 1
0
qX1(t) dϕ(t)−
∫ 1
0
qX1(t) dψ(t) = U1(X1)− U1(X1) = 0
and integration by parts Dunford and Schwartz (1976, III.6.21, Theorem 22) of each integral in
combination with a limiting argument by means of Xn1 := −n ∨X1 ∧ n, n ∈ N, yields
(D.6)
∫ 1
0
(ψ(t)− ϕ(t)) dqX1(t) = 0.
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As Zλ1 ∈ Q1, we observe that ψ ≤ ϕ. Hence (D.6) can only be satisfied if qX1 is constant on
{ψ < ϕ}.
Since P(Z = 0) = 0, we have qZ(1 − s) > 0 for any s ∈ (0, 1), so in particular ψ(t) < 1
for all t < 1. Moreover, ψ(0) = 0 and the slope of ψ is at most 1α . Therefore we have
β := inf{t | ψ(t) < ϕ(t)} ∈ [0, 1) and
(D.7) qX1 is constant on (β, 1) ⊂ {ψ < ϕ}.
If β > 0, it follows for any t ∈ [0, β] that tα = ψ(t) =
∫ 1
1−t
1
λ1
qZ(s)ds. As q Z
λ1
≤ 1α , we deduce
that
(D.8) qZ(s) =
λ1
α
= ess supZ for all s ∈ (1− β, 1].
Since Zλ2 ∈ ∂U2(X2) and as U2 is strictly risk averse conditionally on lower tail-events, X2
is constant on {Z = ess supZ}; see Lemma D.2. Recall that X1 = f(W ), X2 = g(W ) and
Z = h(W ) for increasing functions g and f and a decreasing function h. Consequently (D.7)
implies that f(W ) is constant on W−1(l,∞) whereas (D.8) implies that h(W ) and thus g(W )
are constant on W−1(−∞, l) for l := qW (β) (:= −∞ if β = 0). In conjunction with the fact that
f, g are continuous we deduce that X1 and X2 ought to be of the following form
X1 = (W − l)1{W≤l} + k, X2 = l1{W≤l} +W1{l≤W} − k, where k ∈ R.
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